Psychology: DANGEROUSNESS TO OTHERS
Many states require that there be some
evidence that the individual is dangerous, either to himself or to others. And
indeed, more involuntary hospitalizations are justified on these grounds
than on any others. In some state statutes, the definition of dangerousness is
vague. Florida, for example, provides for commitment when the person is
"likely to injure himself or others if not hospitalized! Illinois, on the other
hand, is much more explicit: a psychologically disordered person can be
hospitalized if he "is reasonably expected at the time the determination is
being made or within a reasonable time thereafter to intentionally physically
injure himself or other persons.
But regardless of how carefully or vaguely it is defined, two serious problems
arise from the notion of dangerousness, one legal and the other scientific.
The legal problem is straightforward. Incarcerating people because
they are predicted to be dangerous creates a dilemma because Western legal
traditions generally mandate the deprivation of liberty only after a crime has
been committed, not before. The mere fact that someone is expected to violate
law is not sufficient reason for incarceration.
This legal problem has painful ramifications, for involuntary commitments
are not entirely unlike imprisonment insofar as deprivation of liberty
is concerned. Yet, few of the procedures that protect an alleged criminal defendant
are available to the psychologically distressed who have been predicted
to be violent. The latter can be involuntarily hospitalized on an
emergency basis for as little as twenty-four hours (in Georgia) to as long as
thirty days (in Oklahoma), entirely without a trial or judge, and often on the
Notes: * California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 5008.
t Florida Stat. Ann. Sec. 394.367 (1973).
:j: Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 91 1/2, Sec. 1-11, 8-1 (Supp. 1973-74).
allegation of a spouse or friend. In some jurisdictions, hospitalization can be
extended indefinitely, simply on the word of a physician who deems the individual
in need of further observation or treatment. And even when the
matter is subjected to judicial review, the courts often rubber-stamp the
physician's view, on the grounds that the hospitalization is being undertaken
with the patient's best interests in mind. Thus, at many such judicial
reviews, the patient need not be present, and commonly is not afforded an
attorney. Many writers, and especially psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (2003),
see in the involuntary commitment process an enormous and needless
abuse of constitutional protection. Yet, no "plot" to deprive the patients of
their rights to due process is intended in these procedures. Rather, because
patients are held to be "sick," and because they are being sent to a hospital,
the ordinary protections of criminal law are deemed unnecessary.
The scientific problems inherent in the prediction of dangerousness are as
difficult as the legal problems. There is reason to doubt whether dangerousness
can ever be predicted so precisely that only the dangerous will be hospitalized,
while the not dangerous will not be. Psychological tests are just not
as reliable as we would like. A variety of studies indicate that psychiatrists
and psychologists are simply unable to predict dangerousness (Diamond,
1974; Ennis and Litwack, 1974; Stone, 1975; Monahan, 1976). One of the
most interesting of these studies (Steadman and Keveles, 1972, 1978) arose
out of the case of Baxtrom v. Herold.*
After serving more than two years for second-degree assault, Johnnie K. Baxtrom
was certified as insane by a prison physician and transferred to a prison-hospital.
Baxtrom's sentence was about to end, however, but because he was still in
need of psychiatric care, the director of the prison-hospital petitioned that Baxtrom
be committed involuntarily to an ordinary psychiatric hospital. That petition
was denied for administrative reasons. Baxtrom, therefore, was forced to
remain where he was.
Baxtrom went to court with the following contention: If he was sane, he deserved
to be discharged as soon as he completed his sentence. And if he was not
sane, he should be transferred to an ordinary psychiatric hospital. Thus, he argued,
his constitutional rights were being violated insofar as he was required to remain
in prison beyond the termination of his sentence.
The United States Supreme Court agreed. And as a result, "Operation
Baxtrom," which was designed to effect the rapid release of 967 similarly
confined patients from New York State's prison-hospitals, was launched.
These people were not merely predicted to be dangerous to others on the
basis of their "insanity." They were also considered to be criminally insane,
held to be violent now and in the future because they had been violent in the
past and because, additionally, they were psychologically distressed. Would
those predictions hold up?
Operation Baxtrom afforded Henry Steadman and his colleagues an excellent
opportunity to follow up on these patients and examine how accurate
psychiatric predictions about dangerousness are. Precisely because
most of these patients had been convicted of a dangerous act, one would expect
predictions about their dangerousness to be quite accurate, since the
years, Steadman and Keveles (1979) reported that only 2.7 percent of these
released patients had behaved dangerously and were either in a correctional
facility or back in a hospital for the criminally insane. Careful examination
of those who were dangerous revealed no "set of factors that could have selected
these returnees from all the Baxtrom patients without a very large
number of false positives-i.e., patients with the same characteristics who
did not act out violently" (Steadman, 2006, p. 318).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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If you are ready to schedule a FREE Consultation...
I encourage you to access this website
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evidence that the individual is dangerous, either to himself or to others. And
indeed, more involuntary hospitalizations are justified on these grounds
than on any others. In some state statutes, the definition of dangerousness is
vague. Florida, for example, provides for commitment when the person is
"likely to injure himself or others if not hospitalized! Illinois, on the other
hand, is much more explicit: a psychologically disordered person can be
hospitalized if he "is reasonably expected at the time the determination is
being made or within a reasonable time thereafter to intentionally physically
injure himself or other persons.
But regardless of how carefully or vaguely it is defined, two serious problems
arise from the notion of dangerousness, one legal and the other scientific.
The legal problem is straightforward. Incarcerating people because
they are predicted to be dangerous creates a dilemma because Western legal
traditions generally mandate the deprivation of liberty only after a crime has
been committed, not before. The mere fact that someone is expected to violate
law is not sufficient reason for incarceration.
This legal problem has painful ramifications, for involuntary commitments
are not entirely unlike imprisonment insofar as deprivation of liberty
is concerned. Yet, few of the procedures that protect an alleged criminal defendant
are available to the psychologically distressed who have been predicted
to be violent. The latter can be involuntarily hospitalized on an
emergency basis for as little as twenty-four hours (in Georgia) to as long as
thirty days (in Oklahoma), entirely without a trial or judge, and often on the
Notes: * California Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 5008.
t Florida Stat. Ann. Sec. 394.367 (1973).
:j: Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 91 1/2, Sec. 1-11, 8-1 (Supp. 1973-74).
allegation of a spouse or friend. In some jurisdictions, hospitalization can be
extended indefinitely, simply on the word of a physician who deems the individual
in need of further observation or treatment. And even when the
matter is subjected to judicial review, the courts often rubber-stamp the
physician's view, on the grounds that the hospitalization is being undertaken
with the patient's best interests in mind. Thus, at many such judicial
reviews, the patient need not be present, and commonly is not afforded an
attorney. Many writers, and especially psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (2003),
see in the involuntary commitment process an enormous and needless
abuse of constitutional protection. Yet, no "plot" to deprive the patients of
their rights to due process is intended in these procedures. Rather, because
patients are held to be "sick," and because they are being sent to a hospital,
the ordinary protections of criminal law are deemed unnecessary.
The scientific problems inherent in the prediction of dangerousness are as
difficult as the legal problems. There is reason to doubt whether dangerousness
can ever be predicted so precisely that only the dangerous will be hospitalized,
while the not dangerous will not be. Psychological tests are just not
as reliable as we would like. A variety of studies indicate that psychiatrists
and psychologists are simply unable to predict dangerousness (Diamond,
1974; Ennis and Litwack, 1974; Stone, 1975; Monahan, 1976). One of the
most interesting of these studies (Steadman and Keveles, 1972, 1978) arose
out of the case of Baxtrom v. Herold.*
After serving more than two years for second-degree assault, Johnnie K. Baxtrom
was certified as insane by a prison physician and transferred to a prison-hospital.
Baxtrom's sentence was about to end, however, but because he was still in
need of psychiatric care, the director of the prison-hospital petitioned that Baxtrom
be committed involuntarily to an ordinary psychiatric hospital. That petition
was denied for administrative reasons. Baxtrom, therefore, was forced to
remain where he was.
Baxtrom went to court with the following contention: If he was sane, he deserved
to be discharged as soon as he completed his sentence. And if he was not
sane, he should be transferred to an ordinary psychiatric hospital. Thus, he argued,
his constitutional rights were being violated insofar as he was required to remain
in prison beyond the termination of his sentence.
The United States Supreme Court agreed. And as a result, "Operation
Baxtrom," which was designed to effect the rapid release of 967 similarly
confined patients from New York State's prison-hospitals, was launched.
These people were not merely predicted to be dangerous to others on the
basis of their "insanity." They were also considered to be criminally insane,
held to be violent now and in the future because they had been violent in the
past and because, additionally, they were psychologically distressed. Would
those predictions hold up?
Operation Baxtrom afforded Henry Steadman and his colleagues an excellent
opportunity to follow up on these patients and examine how accurate
psychiatric predictions about dangerousness are. Precisely because
most of these patients had been convicted of a dangerous act, one would expect
predictions about their dangerousness to be quite accurate, since the
- Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (2006).
years, Steadman and Keveles (1979) reported that only 2.7 percent of these
released patients had behaved dangerously and were either in a correctional
facility or back in a hospital for the criminally insane. Careful examination
of those who were dangerous revealed no "set of factors that could have selected
these returnees from all the Baxtrom patients without a very large
number of false positives-i.e., patients with the same characteristics who
did not act out violently" (Steadman, 2006, p. 318).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Looking for treatment?
If you are ready to schedule a FREE Consultation...
I encourage you to access this website
for the treatment I recommend here:
http://www.TheLiberatorMethod.com/